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INTRODUCTION 
Qualified immunity, as it was developed in the early 1970s, was 
designed to prevent police officers from being held civilly liable for 
constitutional rights violations that were not “clearly established.”1 
The rationale behind this formulation was based in pragmatism as 
much as justice; an officer should not be held accountable for 
violating a right that she did not know existed, but it also benefits 
                                                 
*  Anthony Stauber is a JD candidate at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. 
1. See Qualified Immunity, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY, https:// 
www.law.cornell.edu/ wex/qualified_immunity (last visited Mar. 23, 2018). 
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the courts and police force by limiting the number and quality of 
claims an individual can make against officers. The words “clearly 
established” however, have become something of a Pandora’s Box, 
producing decisions in federal courts that defy a clear pattern. 2 
Specifically, the question of when a right becomes “clearly 
established” has dogged the Supreme Court. The impact of recent 
qualified immunity decisions creates a framework in which courts 
are permitted to rule on cases without determining if there is an 
established right. As a result, instead of creating a growing body of 
literature on what is and is not an established right, the development 
of constitutional jurisprudence stagnates. Further, the public-facing 
impacts of qualified immunity doctrine have seemingly ignored 
victims while providing dubious benefits to the communities and 
the judicial system. This paper examines the modern trends in the 
qualified immunity doctrine which permit and encourage 
constitutional stagnation, and the harms created by qualified 
immunity and exacerbated by its modern interpretations. Its goal is 
to lay the foundation for a discussion of more radical solutions to 
the qualified immunity problem specifically, to ask if it is time to 
eliminate the doctrine altogether. 
THE EVOLUTION OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 
A.  Saucier, Katz, and Mandatory Sequencing 
The most prominent decision in the early history of qualified 
immunity was Harlow v. Fitzgerald, which reiterated the dual 
purposes of common-law immunity standards: “to shield them from 
undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling 
threats of liability.” 3  However Harlow, relying on several other 
Supreme Court decisions, etched into the annals of qualified 
immunity jurisprudence that officers should be shielded from civil 
liability, insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known. 4  As we will see, the definition of “clearly 
                                                 
2. See Colin Rolfs, Qualified Immunity After Pearson v. Callahan, 59 UCLA L. 
REV. 468 (2011). 
3. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). 
4. See id.; see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). 
 
2
Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice, Vol. 39 [2018], Art. 7
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol39/iss1/7
Spring 2018] Stauber 127 
 
established” will become one of paramount importance, and a 
challenge with which the courts continue to struggle. 
In 2001, the Supreme Court ruled on Saucier v. Katz and further 
developed the standard for qualified immunity. 5  The court 
identified two distinct hurdles that a plaintiff must clear: First, 
“[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, 
do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a 
Constitutional right?”6 And second, “[i]f a violation could be made 
out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions [was the right] 
clearly established?”7 The term “clearly established” was further 
defined in Saucier to mean that it must have been “clear to a 
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 
confronted.”8 
Embedded in this decision was a comment on judicial 
sequencing. Under Saucier, to determine if a Plaintiff could defeat 
summary judgment, the court used a two-tier procedure: first, did 
the officer violate a constitutional right, and second, was that right 
clearly established?9 If the answer to either of these questions is no, 
the Plaintiff has not met their burden of proof and qualified 
immunity will prevent her from receiving relief. 10  However, 
Saucier required the court to make a constitutional determination, 
even if it was clear that the law was not clearly established. 11 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy asserted that the first step 
ruling on the question of immunity was a threshold question: 
“[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, 
do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a 
Constitutional right?”12 In practical terms, this meant that for every 
civil action against a police officer, there would at least be a ruling 
on if the conduct in question violated a constitutional right. In 
theory, rights that were not clearly established in one case, would 
become clearly established for subsequent cases. 
                                                 
5. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
6. See id. at 201. 
7. See id.  
8. See id. 
9. Id. at 201. 
10. Id. 
11. Rolfs, supra note 2, at 473. 
12. See supra note 2, at 473.  
 
3
Stauber: When is a Right Not a Right?: Qualified Immunity After Pearson
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
128 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. [39 
 
In the following decade, there was substantial push-back on 
what has been termed “mandatory sequencing.” 13  In several 
dissenting opinions, Justices Breyer, Scalia, Ginsburg, and Stevens 
expressed their view that mandatory sequencing would be overly-
burdensome on the courts and did not improve the quality of 
qualified immunity analysis in the lower courts.14 In Brosseau v. 
Haugen, Justices Scalia and Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer in a 
concurring opinion in which he wrote: 
I . . . express my concern about . . . the way in which lower courts 
are required to evaluate claims of qualified immunity under the 
Court’s decision in Saucier v. Katz. I am concerned that the current 
rule rigidly requires courts unnecessarily to decide difficult 
constitutional questions when there is an easier basis for the decision 
(e.g., qualified immunity) that will satisfactorily resolve the case 
before the court. Indeed when courts’ dockets are crowded, a rigid 
“order of battle” makes little administrative sense . . . 15 
In a more prosaic opinion Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part, stated in Morse v. Frederick, “I would end the failed Saucier 
experiment now.”16 
Mandatory sequencing’s opponents made no secret of their 
concern about logistics and administration. The criticism most 
commonly made was that mandatory sequencing would make 
litigation unnecessarily lengthy, and thus interfere with the regular 
activities of police officers.17 As one of the underlying goals of 
qualified immunity in common law as well as landmark cases such 
as Harlow, that criticism is valid if we make a few assumptions.18 
First, that mandatory sequencing would substantially increase the 
time police officers spend litigating claims against them. 19  We 
could go further and suggest that it is an assumption that increasing 
police officers’ time in the court room would substantially interfere 
with the administration of justice overall. Second, that the value of 
Constitutional articulation in the lower courts and the development 
                                                 
13. Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 
89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 15–23 (2015). 
14. See, e.g., Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019 (2004). 
15. 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004). 
16. 551 U.S. 393, 432 (2007). 
17. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).   
18. See generally Harlow, 457 U.S. 800; see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511. 
19. See Neilson & Walker, supra note 13, at 26; see also Rolfs, supra note 2, at 
477–78. 
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of a body of jurisprudence relating to what is “clearly established” 
is insignificant compared with logistical and administrative 
concerns. The first is a question of fact and the second of judgment, 
and both will be addressed later in this paper. 
For our current purposes, these assumptions bring into sharp 
relief the values that the Supreme Court was bringing to the 
discussion of qualified immunity. At least under Saucier the Court 
decided that, whatever logistical burden it may impose, mandatory 
sequencing was necessary to advance the law. 20  Looking more 
broadly, it would not be reaching to believe that the proponents of 
mandatory sequencing were concerned about the very thing—
stagnation and an overbroad interpretation of qualified immunity—
that would come to pass in Pearson.21 
B.  Pearson and Graham; Not Much Hope 
In 2009, the Supreme Court heard Pearson v. Callahan, and 
overruled Saucier, discarding this mandatory procedure. 22  In its 
place, it gave courts the discretion to avoid the constitutional 
question if they could find that the right was not clearly 
established.23 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito stated: 
[W]e conclude that, while the sequence set forth there is often 
appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory. The 
judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be 
permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the 
two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed 
first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.24 
For civil actions against police officers under Pearson, if a judge 
determines that the right in question is not clearly established, that 
judge need not determine if there had been a constitutional 
violation.25 The action would produce no precedent. The majority, 
however, seemed confident that giving discretion to the lower courts 
to determine which prong of the qualified immunity analysis they 
                                                 
20. See generally Saucier, 533 U.S. 194. 
21. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); see also Rolfs, supra note 
2, at 478–80.  
22. 555 U.S. 223. 
23. See id.  
24. Id. at 236. 
25. Id.; Rolfs, supra note 2 at 479. 
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would address first, if at all, they would continue to do so when the 
circumstances called for it.26 In one particularly prescient statement, 
Justice Alito stated: “In addition, the Saucier Court was certainly 
correct in noting that the two-step procedure promotes the 
development of constitutional precedent and is especially valuable 
with respect to questions that do not frequently arise in cases in 
which a qualified immunity defense is unavailable.”27 
Thus, the Pearson majority found that mandatory sequencing 
was valuable as a tool to develop a body of decisions dealing with 
a wide range of unique factual circumstances. 28  They believed, 
however, that left to their own devices, lower courts would rule on 
both prongs of the qualified immunity when the case called for it.29 
This, as we will see, proved to be naïve. 
With Pearson as the controlling case, the doctrine of qualified 
immunity has been murky. To begin, because Pearson gave lower 
courts the freedom to skip the constitutional question of if the right 
in question was “clearly established,” they did.30 Often. Thus, the 
body of jurisprudence from which plaintiffs could draw under 
Saucier dried up under Pearson.31 Neilson explains: 
                                                 
26. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (“On reconsidering the procedure required in 
Saucier, we conclude that, while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, 
it should no longer be regarded as mandatory. The judges of the district courts 
and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion 
in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be 
addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”).  
27. Id. 
28. Id. (“In addition, the Saucier Court was certainly correct in noting that the 
two-step procedure promotes the development of constitutional precedent and is 
especially valuable with respect to questions that do not frequently arise in cases 
in which a qualified immunity defense is unavailable.”). 
29. Id.  
30. Neilson & Walker, supra note 13 at 29 (citing Rolfs, supra note 2 at 497-
98, concluding that “there is a significantly high probability that Pearson has had 
an actual effect on the rate at which circuit courts avoid constitutional 
determinations”); see also Ted Sampsell-Jones & Jenna Yauch, Measuring 
Pearson in the Circuits, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 623, 625 (2011) (examining every 
published court of appeals case that cited Pearson from 2009 to 2010 and finding 
that the court avoided constitutional questions in 19.5% of cases). 
31 . See John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for Unnecessary 
Constitutional Ruling in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
403, 410 (1999). 
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Rights only become clearly established as a result of a court holding 
that, on a particular set of facts, there was a constitutional violation. 
If a court makes no constitutional determination after denying a 
plaintiff a remedy because the law was not dearly established by a 
previous decision with analogous facts, a remedy will be denied in a 
later case with a similar violation, because the right is still not clearly 
established. In this way, constitutional violations can indefinitely go 
without being remedied, and officials can continuously engage in 
unconstitutional conduct.32 
Beyond the freedom to skip constitutional questions afforded to 
judges under Pearson, research suggests that judges often reverse-
engineer the answers to constitutional questions based on their 
knowing that the defendant will be granted qualified immunity.33 
Researchers from the College of William and Mary found that 
judges are reluctant to acknowledge a constitutional violation where 
they subsequently intend to grant qualified immunity.34 They wrote: 
In an effort to avoid [cognitive] dissonance, therefore, judges may-
entirely unintentionally-allow their beliefs about whether a 
government officer is entitled to qualified immunity to influence 
their analysis of whether a constitutional violation occurred at all.35 
In essence, this is a direct rebuke of Justice Alito’s hopes that 
lower courts would make a good-faith effort to address both prongs 
of the qualified immunity analysis when the circumstances called 
for it. Constitutional stagnation is not merely boon for abstract legal 
discussions. The ability of courts to skip the Constitutional question 
has made it quantifiably more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in 
civil actions against police officers.36 
Apart from Constitutional stagnation, Pearson-style qualified 
immunity analysis is again murky when it comes to novel factual 
circumstances. In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court again 
addressed nuanced questions of qualified immunity applicability.37 
In this particular case, they arrived at a conclusion that suggested 
                                                 
32. Rolfs, supra note 2 at 479. 
33. Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical 




36. See Nielson & Walker, supra note 13 at 29. 
37. See 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
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that previous cases a plaintiff is using to claim that the officer acted 
unreasonable needs to be appropriately specific to the factual 
circumstances in their case.38 They wrote: 
The validity of the claim must then be judged by reference to the 
specific constitutional standard which governs that right, rather than 
to some generalized “excessive force” standard.39 
Inconveniently, the court left wide open what an “appropriate 
level of specificity” was to be.40 In subsequent cases, courts found 
even egregious violators of Constitutional rights to be immune from 
liability because the case law the plaintiffs cited as on point were 
not similar enough to give the defendant officer notice that their 
actions were wrong.41 Other times, it seemed that the court was not 
asking for similarity, but identical circumstances.42 
The Supreme Court addressed this problem in Hope v. Pelzer, a 
case that attempted to rein in the scope of qualified immunity 
application.43 Hope found that “officials can still be on notice that 
their conduct violates established law even in novel factual 
                                                 
38. See id.  
39. Id. at 394. 
40. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640; see also Wilson v. Layne, 
526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999); Neilson & Walker, supra note 13 at 397. 
41. See Suissa v. Fulton Cty., Ga., 74 F.3d 266 (11th Cir. 1996) (abrogated by 
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)) (Suisa, a government employee, alleged 
that he and the other defendant were discriminated against because they were 
Jewish. Fulton County Marshal Captain asked Suisa to write a report detailing his 
grievances, whereupon the captain allegedly threatened Suisa to influence the 
contents of Suisa’s report. The appellate court concluded that, despite several 
decisions that were on point and that defendants should have known of, the 
decisions do not “dictate, that is truly compel . . . the conclusion that an 
unsuccessful attempt to prevent protected speech violates the First 
Amendment.”). 
42 . See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, (2011) (“a government 
official’s conduct violates clearly established law when at the time of the 
challenged conduct the contours of the right are sufficiently clear that every 
reasonable office would have understood that what he is doing violates that 
right . . . we do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must 
have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” (internal 
citations omitted)); See generally Karen Blum, Erwin Chemerinsky, & Martin A. 
Schwartz, Qualified Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 
29 TOURO L. REV. 633, 651-656 (2012-2013). 
43. See 536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
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circumstances.”44 The standard they established was that the state 
of the law needed to give officers “fair warning” that the officer’s 
conduct was illegal.45 As Rolfs points out, “[t]his holding greatly 
relaxed the standard that was purportedly announced in Saucier, 
making it ‘much easier for civil rights plaintiffs’ to overcome 
qualified immunity.” 46  In retrospect, Hope seems out of place 
during a time when decision after decision affirmed a broad 
application of qualified immunity that unequivocally favored the 
interests of government actors over alleged victims. However, in 
subsequent cases involving unnecessary force, courts seemed to 
ignore Hope as an outlier because the conduct of the government 
actor so obviously violated established law that case law with 
similar circumstances was not necessary.47 
With the standards for similar factual circumstances so unclear, 
it is poignant to look at one of the key justifications in Pearson for 
allowing judges to skip the constitutional question.48 The words 
speak for themselves: 
Although the first prong of the Saucier procedure is intended to 
further the development of constitutional precedent, opinions 
following that procedure often fail to make a meaningful 
contribution to such development. For one thing, there are cases in 
which the constitutional question is so factbound that the decision 
provides little guidance for future cases.49 
In other words, Pearson tells us that many mandatory 
sequencing decision hold little value because they are overly 
“factbound” and are unlikely to contribute to further jurisprudence. 
Therefore, they argue, it would be a better use of judicial resources 
                                                 
44. Id. at 741. 
45. Id.  
46. See Philip Sheng, An “Objectively Reasonable” Criticism of the Doctrine 
of Qualified Immunity in Excessive Force Cases Brought Under 42 U.S.C § 1983, 
26 BYU J. PUB. L. 99, 107 (2012). 
47 . See Hope, 536 U.S. at 730.; See also Sheng, supra note 46 at 107 
(“[i]nterestingly however, in the only excessive force case to be heard since Hope 
where clearly established was at issue, the Court seemed to completely ignore 
Hope.”). 
48. See 555 U.S. at 237. 
49 . Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237 (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 388 
(counseling against the Saucier two-step protocol where the question is “so fact 
dependent that the result will be confusion rather than clarity”)).  
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if lower courts skipped this analysis if the constitutional ruling will 
be too fact-specific.50 That same court then held in Graham that any 
plaintiff claiming that government officers should not be afforded 
qualified immunity must present evidence of appropriate specificity 
showing that the officer should have known they were acting 
unreasonably.51 The very “factbound” determinations that would 
have been mandatory under Saucier and could satisfy the specificity 
requirement under Graham are discouraged and unavailable under 
Pearson. Whether the Graham court anticipated the very broad 
reading of “appropriate specificity” is uncertain. But what is certain 
is that, in its current iteration, qualified immunity is closer to 
absolute immunity, and a plaintiff’s burden is almost 
insurmountable. 
THE JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 
Setting aside, for now, the impact that this legal catch-22 has on 
victims of police violence and other misconduct, qualified 
immunity presents another profound challenge: the discovery and 
implementation of rights and remedies. 52  Constitutional scholar 
Owen Fisk described the separate duties of courts of “discovering 
the meaning of constitutional values such as equality, liberty, or 
property . . . [and] fashioning the most effective strategy for 
actualizing those values.” 53   Qualified immunity in its current 
iteration does not encourage courts to make decisions and analyze 
questions with the goal of discovering constitutional values. 54 
                                                 
50 . See generally, id. at 236-37 (“The [mandatory sequencing] procedure 
sometimes results in a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on 
difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome of the case. There are cases 
in which it is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from 
obvious whether in fact there is such a right. District courts and courts of appeals 
with heavy caseloads are often understandably unenthusiastic about what may 
seem to be an essentially academic exercise.”). 
51. 490 U.S. at 397. 
52. See generally, Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 51 
(1979). 
53. Id. 
54 . See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in 
Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 120 (“For rights that depend on 
vindication through damage actions, the repeated invocation of qualified 
immunity will reduce the meaning of the Constitution to the lowest plausible 
conception of its content. Functionally, the Constitution will be defined not by 
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Notably, the ability for courts to sidestep constitutional questions 
retards the “discovery” of true rights. In similar fashion, the courts’ 
treatment of victims has established a “rights-backwards” approach 
that has curtailed the scope of Constitutional rights. 
A.  Discovering Rights 
The judiciary has a unique role with regard to individual rights. 
In one sense, they are purely instrumental of the legislature. The 
courts do not get to “discover” rights in that they do not get to write 
legislation that either expands or curtails the expression of some 
abstract concept of a right. On the other hand, however, courts act 
as illuminators of “true rights” – that is, the pursuit of a perfect 
application of the abstract to the concrete. Whenever the legislature 
writes laws or statutes, the courts are in a position to test the 
application of those laws or statutes to an infinite number of factual 
scenarios. If we envision each of those applications as a data points 
on a graph, the composite will display the arc of our true rights. 
Modern qualified immunity starves our legal system of 
constitutional jurisprudence and severely hampers our discovery of 
rights. 
Many understand the Constitution is not a static document 
without nuance. Branches of legal study and political philosophy 
have been dedicated to the explication of the Constitution in ever-
evolving contexts. That is not to make a statement on interpretivism 
or framers’ intent—even Justices Scalia and Ginsburg would agree 
that the text of the Constitution must be interpreted in order for it to 
have any value to specific circumstances. 
Assume ad absurdum that some combination of the Supreme 
Court and lower courts had addressed literally every factual 
circumstance and articulated the Constitutional outcome 
satisfactorily. We would have a perfect outline of those things 
which were permitted and those which were not; we would have 
actualized the concept of “true rights”. Christopher Eisgruber writes 
that “[f]rom the vantage of the Constitution, accordingly, ‘rights’ 
are mandatory constraints upon government” which “attach to states 
                                                 
what judges, in their wisdom, think it does or should mean, but by the most 
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of affairs which are required by the Constitution.”55 In this sense, 
every time that the Constitution is applied to a novel circumstance, 
we get one step closer to a perfect understanding of our own true 
rights—or the “state of affairs required by the Constitution”—and 
how to conduct ourselves so as to not infringe upon the rights of 
others.56 
Insofar as we assume that the Constitution is the ideal 
framework for balancing rights and promoting net benefits, 
developing this understanding of the Constitution applied to any 
number of circumstances is essential to bringing us closer to a 
perfect, Constitutional republic. That is, there is a correlative 
relationship between the sheer number of constitutional questions 
that a court answers and the discovery of our constitutional values. 
That is not to say that all jurisprudence makes a meaningful 
contribution to our understanding of the Constitution and the rights 
implicated therein. Rolfs characterized the argument that 
Constitutional articulation—answering the Constitutional question 
in all qualified immunity cases—may lead to bad precedent. 
“Mandatory sequencing may force courts to decide constitutional 
questions with insufficient information…[a] court opinion written 
[with insufficient information] may not be helpful to other courts.”57 
All things considered, proponents of this argument will say, it would 
be wiser for courts to skip the constitutional question. Essentially, 
the argument goes, bad facts make bad law, and the nature of claims 
involving qualified immunity inherently contain bad facts.58 
Assuming that mandatory sequencing in fact leads to more 
“bad” law, there are two main flaws with this argument. The first 
one I have already addressed: the requirement under Pearson and 
Graham for factually similar circumstances with “appropriate 
specificity” would suggest that any case law, no matter how 
insufficiently developed, might be helpful for future litigation. 
The second shortcoming in this argument is that it fails to see 
the bigger picture. Critiques on logistical shortcomings such as the 
possibility for bad law seem to implicate an underlying invalidity in 
                                                 
55. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and 
Religious Liberty after City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 88 
(1997). 
56. Id. 
57. Rolfs, supra note 2 at 483. 
58. See Rolfs, supra note 2 at 482. 
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constitutional litigation as a whole. 59  In other words, some 
opponents of mandatory sequencing see utilitarian concerns as 
independent and sufficient justification to discard the whole 
concept.60 Fiss’ response seems to state the obvious; that logistical 
issues can be addressed with logistical solutions.61 He writes:  
Like an art, [judicial communication] always seems in peril. But the 
principal threats to this capacity . . . have nothing to do with structural 
reform; . . . these threats to the integrity of the judicial process can 
be fought in ways that leave the structural suit untouched as a 
distinctive mode of constitutional litigation.62  
Although the production of bad law, judicial overwork, and 
burdening the court system are valid concerns, none persuasively 
outweigh the value that comes from discovering rights.63 
B.  Discovering Remedies 
Fundamentally, courts have been grappling with an unavoidable 
conflict between the abstract, essentialist, capital-letter 
Constitutional Rights, and the utilitarian, pragmatic constitutional 
rights.64 In one sense, the latter is a function of the former. The 
judiciary (and if we are going to further suspend our cynicism, the 
legislature) exists to realize our “true” Constitutional Rights by 
embodying them in official decisions, laws, statutes, and, most 
importantly, remedies. This view is a “rights-forward” approach 
wherein the rights create the remedies. “The remedy,” writes Fiss, 
“expresses the judge’s desire to give a meaning to a constitutional 
value that is more tangible, more full-blooded than a mere 
                                                 
59. Pearson 555 U.S. at 237 (“Many constitutional determinations fail to make 
meaningful contribution to [constitutional] development.”). 
60. See id. at 239. 
61. See Fiss at 45. 
62. Id. (Fiss’ response is not specific to bad jurisprudence (he is addressing the 
problem of judges being overworked), but nonetheless characterizes the 
counterargument). 
63. Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence cannot be developed in 
the abstract— the system needs to be “fed” in order to advance and demonstrate 
the arc of our true rights. 
64. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 82 (1977) (Explaining crudely, 
“this is the distinction between arguments of principle on the one hand and 
arguments of policy on the other”). 
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declaration of what a right is.”65 Daryl Levinson adds an important 
point of analysis to this discussion.66 He writes, 
Rights are the “true meaning of . . . constitutional values, such as 
equality liberty, due process, or property . . .” Remedies are designed 
to “actualize the constitutional value and incorporate considerations 
that are not principled corollaries of the constitutional value but 
rather are “subsidiary,” “strategic,” and “instrumental.” Thus, 
remedies are “subordinate” to rights. They are not only subordinate, 
but also metaphysically segregated, for “rights operate in the world 
of abstraction, remedies in the world of practical reality.”67 
Under a rights-forward approach, then, remedies exist 
subordinate to the rights that call for them. Their value is determined 
by the extent to which they actualize our abstract conceptions of 
rights; how well they move from the “realm of abstraction” to the 
“world of practical reality.”68 This is a symbiotic relationship with 
the rights-discovering function. As jurisprudence develops a wide 
body of unique factual applications of the Constitution, we get a 
better understanding of the “true rights” which govern (or permit) 
our actions in the republic. Remedies make our understanding of 
“true rights” actionable and tangible. In a word, they make those 
rights exist. 
The distinction between rights-forward and rights-backward 
approaches—one that is critical in our discussion of rights and 
remedies in the context of qualified immunity—is not necessarily 
the existence of a remedy. Although a right without any remedy is 
almost certainly rights-backward (and, as Levinson would state, no 
right at all) it is not the remedy’s non-existence that gives us this 
insight. 69   It is the question of whether we are tailoring our 
conception of the right to reflect the available or desirable remedy. 
The formulation of rights in modern qualified immunity 
jurisprudence is markedly rights-backward. Levinson tracks an 
important and analogous evolution in cases involving constitutional 
claims for unacceptable prison conditions. 70  Citing Hutto v. 
                                                 
65. Fiss, supra note 52 at 46. 
66. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 870 (1999). 
67. Id. (quoting Fiss, supra note 52 at 51–52). 
68. Id. at 871. 
69. See id. at 888. 
70. Id. at 878–882. 
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Finney71 and Rhodes v. Chapman72, Levinson explains how courts 
can slip into rights-backward thinking.73 In Hutto and Rhodes, the 
courts originally found that the prison conditions violated the Eighth 
Amendment. 74  That is, applied to these unique factual 
circumstances, the courts discovered another contour in the “true 
rights” of prisoners. In order to effectuate that true right, they need 
to create some sort of remedy. In each of these cases, the prisons 
eventually discarded specific objectionable practices “even though 
any one or several of these conditions in isolation might not be 
sufficient to trigger a constitutional violation.” 75  Because courts 
often look to other courts to provide guidance on particularly 
endemic problems, those remedial measures became criteria for 
subsequent prison-conditions lawsuits. In other words, rather than 
courts looking to the Eighth Amendment to fashion remedies 
effectuating the “true rights” contained therein, they began using the 
remedies offered in prior litigation to determine what rights the 
victim actually had. 
The rights-backward nature of prison reform litigation is not 
theoretical.  
Besides becoming part of the definition of the right, prison reform 
remedies have also influenced the scope of the Eighth Amendment 
less directly. Expansive district court structural reform of prisons 
where conditions [do not meet those criteria developed in Hutto and 
Rhodes] has provoked the Supreme Court to curtail the scope of the 
right.76 
A straight line can be drawn from Levinson’s analysis of prison-
condition litigation to qualified immunity. For one, the requirement 
that any constitutional right violation be “clearly established” 
suggests that a plaintiff only has a right (such as against 
unreasonable search and seizure, excessive force, etc.) insofar as 
that right has been established by external forces. There is no 
inherency. Prior litigation does not interpret the right for the purpose 
                                                 
71. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).  
72. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).  
73. Levinson, supra note 66 at 878–882. 
74. See Hutto, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); see also Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
75. Levinson, supra note 66 at 879. 
76. Id. at 881. 
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of determining the appropriate remedy; it is part of the definition 
itself. 
Second, the definition of the constitutional right has been 
contoured around the available remedy. Take, for example, the 
majority holding in Davis v. Scherer 77, denying the plaintiff’s claim 
against the defendant for violation of federal constitutional rights; 
It would become more difficult, not only for officials to anticipate 
the possible legal consequences of their conduct, but also for trial 
courts to decide even frivolous suits without protracted litigation. 
Nor is it always fair, or sound policy, to demand official compliance 
with statute and regulation on pain of money damages. Such officials 
as police officers or prison wardens, . . . routinely make close 
decisions in the exercise of the broad authority that necessarily is 
delegated to them. These officials are subject to a plethora of rules, 
“often so voluminous, ambiguous, and contradictory, and in such 
flux that officials can only comply with or enforce them 
selectively.”(citation omitted).78 
The scope of the plaintiff’s rights is predicated on the ability of 
the court to create and implement a remedy.79 Fiss describes this as 
the “tailoring principle,” which, in his words, “also obscures the 
criteria of choice in suggesting that the violation will be the 
exclusive source of the remedy: it suggests that the shape of the 
remedy is exclusively a function of the definition of the violation.”80 
Insofar as Pearson requires that for any violation to be actionable, 
it must be of a clearly established constitutional right of which a 
reasonable person would know, the remedy is a function of the 
violation. 
As it relates to Levinson’s concern that rights-backward 
formulations will lead courts to curtail the scope of the right81 , 
qualified immunity doctrine echoes the pattern in prison-condition 
litigation. First, the right in question—here, the right against 
unreasonable force, unreasonable search and seizure, etc.—is 
tailored to the remedy. What is available as a remedy to these 
violations is a lawsuit for compensatory damages if and only if the 
Pearson criteria are met. In that sense, those rights have Pearson 
baked in—you do not have an absolute right against unreasonable 
                                                 
77. 468 U.S. 183, 206 (1984). 
78. Id. at 196. 
79. See generally Levinson, supra note 66 at 870. 
80. Fiss, supra note 52 at 48. 
81. See Levinson, supra note 66. 
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police, but you have a right against unreasonable police force where 
the officer should have known that he was violating a right. Because 
of public policy considerations like those articulated in Davis, we 
as a society choose not to provide a remedy for unreasonable police 
force where the officer was acting reasonably. Thus, our conception 
of the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable force is 
tailored to fit around the Davis concerns. “A subtle inversion of 
right and remedy thus occurs[,]” writes Levinson, “[r]emedies are 
used by courts to define a constitutional standard that would 
otherwise be impossible to articulate, and those remedies become 
the normative criteria by which constitutional violations are 
judged.”82 
Second, the rights-backward state of qualified immunity leads 
to courts curtailing the scope of individual rights. If we imagine the 
formulation of rights and remedies as a road, the first trip is from 
remedy to rights, as discussed above. Once we have arrived at the 
right by way of the remedy, that is, we have a definition of the right 
that is subordinate to the remedy, courts use that right to create and 
apply a remedy. As Fiss explains, 
[T]he tailoring principle fundamentally misleads. It does in fact tend 
to support an artificial conception of "violation" – one that looks back 
and that sees discrete incidents as the object of the remedy – but it 
also errs in an even more basic way. It suggests that the relationship 
between remedy and violation is deductive or formal, and thereby 
gives us an impoverished notion of remedy.83 
It is this “impoverished notion of remedy” that provides the annals 
of qualified immunity litigation with some of its most egregious 
miscarriages of justice.84 
                                                 
82. Id. at 880. 
83. Fiss, supra note 52 at 47. 
84. See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014) (holding that there 
was no clearly established right against police officers using lethal force to end a 
high-speed car chase); Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 
364, 379 (2009) (affirming the grant of qualified immunity for a middle school 
assistant principal and school nurse who conducted a strip search on a 13-year-
old student, writing, “the cases viewing school strip searches differently from the 
way we see them are numerous enough, with well-reasoned majority and 
dissenting opinions, to counsel doubt that we were sufficiently clear in the prior 
statement of law.”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, How the Supreme Court 
Protects Bad Cops, N. Y. TIMES (2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/ 
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OUTSIDE OF THE COURTROOM: QUALIFIED IMMUNITIES VICTIMS 
AND FICTIONS 
A.  Judicial Notice 
Beyond the abstract, one important function of constitutional 
and doctrinal development is the notice-giving function that has for 
government officers. Again, assuming that the Constitution creates 
a framework for the most effective, fair, and just system of 
governance, we conclude that giving guidance to government 
officers on how to more closely adhere to the Constitution will get 
us closer to a “perfect” society of law and order. The more officers 
know what they can and cannot do, and the more specific each of 
those imperatives is, the closer society comes to an ideal realization 
of its rights. In this sense, Pearson fails us because it allows 
repeated violations of citizens’ rights without a judicial 
determination that would deter such conduct in future cases. Jack 
Beermann, Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law, 
writes, 
In some circumstances, repeated immunity findings can cause the 
law to stagnate. With regard to constitutional claims that are likely 
to be litigated only in the constitutional tort context, officials might 
repeatedly engage in the same conduct and successfully defend 
damages suits with qualified immunity, leaving the scope of 
constitutional rights undetermined.85 
In principle, the function of the “clearly established” prong of 
qualified immunity analysis is to give a notice to police officers and 
provide guidance for future conduct. 86  A large issue arises, 
                                                 
27/opinion/how-the-supreme-court-protects-bad-cops.html?_r=0 (“for ex-ample, 
the officer who shot Michael Brown can be held liable only if every reasonable 
officer would have known that the shooting constituted the use of excessive force 
and was not self-defense.”); see also Alan K. Cheng, Qualified Immunity Limiting 
Access to Justice and Impeding Development of the Law, 41 ABA HUM. RTS. 




85. Jack Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance.2009 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 139, 141 (2009). 
86. See Neilson & Walker, supra note 13 at 24. 
 
18
Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice, Vol. 39 [2018], Art. 7
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol39/iss1/7
Spring 2018] Stauber 143 
 
therefore, when courts stop ruling on the Constitutional question in 
these cases; police do not receive judicial guidance. Nielson writes, 
“if courts do not exercise their discretion to decide questions in 
[constitutionally uncertain cases], there would be a ‘significant 
possibility that conscientious law enforcement officers will be 
deprived of needed judicial guidance . . . .’”87 There are an infinite 
number of factual circumstances that involve a Constitutional 
question. Creating a wealth of rulings and opinions is an effective 
way to keep doctrine and police procedure as “fresh” as possible.88 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Stephen Reinhardt 
voiced his particular concern with the issue of judicial notice and 
advancing technology.89 He writes, 
At a time in which it is vital for constitutional law to keep pace with 
changes in technology, social norms, and political practices, this 
trend toward granting immunity while failing to articulate 
constitutional rights will surely have far-reaching, negative 
repercussions.90 
One area where we can see just how aberrant this notion is—
that technology will continue to advance without the law developing 
to guide its use by law enforcement—is in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Early landmark Fourth Amendment cases 
demonstrated the Supreme Court’s interest—one might even say 
obsession—with examining the scope and permissibility of new 
technologies. 91  As technology and law enforcement capabilities 
develop and expand, so does the quantity of judicial opinions 
relating to those capabilities. But as long as courts have the option 
                                                 
87. Id. 
88. Rolfs, supra note 2 at 479–80. 
89. See Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of 
Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the 
Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly 
Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219 (2015). 
90. Id. at 1250. 
91 . See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (assessing the 
constitutionality of recording defendant in a telephone booth with an electronic 
recording device); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (instillation and use 
of a “pen register” on defendant’s phone was not a search and no warrant was 
required); Kyllo v. United States, 553 U.S. 27 (2001) (both the “use of sense-
enhancing technology to gather information about the interior of a home,” and 
“use or thermal imaging to measure heat emanating from a home” are “searches” 
under the Fourth Amendment). 
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to sidestep the constitutional question, it is unlikely that judicial 
guidance on questions involving technology will be satisfactorily 
and prudently answered. 
B.  Accountability 
Inversely, it is essential to be able to hold police officers 
accountable for their actions. Researchers have found that effective 
procedures for redressing harms caused by individual officers and 
agencies are essential for reducing crime. 92  Insofar as modern 
qualified immunity interpretation sets a near unobtainable standard 
for plaintiffs to hold police officers accountable, it fails to achieve 
its purpose. 
David Bayley identifies two ways in which violating the rule of 
law reduces enforcement effectiveness.93 First, “violating the rule-
of-law lessens the willingness of the public to assist the police in 
carrying out their assigned role.”94 This analysis comes from the 
idea that a great deal of police information comes from the public 
and is offered voluntarily. Empirically, if police cannot obtain 
information from the public, their chance of solving a crime 
decreases substantially.95 Second, when police officers violate the 
rule of law, they alienate the community they are supposed to 
serve.96 Bayley suggests that this creates a cycle in which “abuse by 
the police intensifies public suspicion and hostility toward the 
police” which then “prompts police to exert their authority . . . 
perhaps more forcibly” and restart the cycle.” 97 
                                                 
92. See Samuel Walker, Police Accountability: Current Issues and Research 
Needs,NAT’L INST. OF JUST.(2006), https://www.ncjrs.gov /pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 
218583.pdf. 
93 . David H. Bayley, Law Enforcement and the Rule of Law: Is There a 
Tradeoff?, 2 J. CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 133 (2002) (although Bayley’s 
research looked into instances in which police officers unexcusedly violated the 
law, there is no reason to believe that those same effects would not be present in 
cases where officers violated the law but were technically excused.) 
94. Id. at 141. 
95. Id. at 142 (citing Peter W. Greenwood, Jan M. Chaiken, and Joan Petersilia, 
The Criminal Investigation Process, NAT’L INST. L. ENFORCEMENT & CRIM. 
JUST. (1977)). 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 143. 
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C.  Chilling 
One of the most touted justifications behind qualified immunity 
is the fear of chilling police action.98 This was one of the main 
concerns that the majority expressed in Harlow; “the fear of civil 
rights lawsuits may cause officials to be ‘overdeterred.’” 99  The 
Supreme Court has previously expressed their belief that subjecting 
a government official to civil liability can “dampen the ardor of all 
but the most resolute . . . [public officials], in the unflinching 
discharge of their duties.”100 
Current events, including the apparent and dramatic increase 
cases of deadly force being employed on unarmed, black men, have 
brought this discussion to a head. In non-academic circles, the 
theory of the “Ferguson Effect” has become ubiquitous (in the 
months following cases such as the shooting of Michael Brown in 
Ferguson, Missouri, many cities, especially those with marked 
racial tensions, see an increase in crime.) 101   According to 
proponents of the Ferguson Effect theory, this spike in crime is due 
to police being deterred from vigorously performing their duties, 
resulting in less-effective law enforcement. 102  Policymakers and 
government officials, all the way up to the Attorney General, have 
remarked on the Ferguson Effect, and the continued need for a 
robust doctrine of qualified immunity.103 
The project of this paper is not to discuss the multifaceted issues 
raised by the Ferguson Effect. The intersections of race relations, 
socioeconomic disparity, police militarization, and historic 
discrimination are numerous; and undoubtedly all play a role in the 
phenomena in cities such as Ferguson and Baltimore. However, it 
is prudent to look to those cities as case studies that bring the 
question of chilling into sharp relief. Looked at in this light, 
proponents of qualified immunity and believers in the Ferguson 
Effect make two very important and flawed assumptions. First, they 
                                                 
98. See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806–07. 
99. Id. 
100. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964). 
101. Shaila Dewan, Deconstructing the ‘Ferguson Effect’, N. Y. TIMES 
(2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/us/politics/ferguson-
effect.html?_r=0. 




Stauber: When is a Right Not a Right?: Qualified Immunity After Pearson
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
146 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. [39 
 
assume that fear of liability does in fact deter police actions, and 
second, that officials’ deterrence is necessarily and problematically 
overbroad. 104  As we will see, both of these assumptions are 
unfounded.  
First, there has been a wealth of research on the issue of whether 
fear of liability actually chills police conduct. Joanna Schwartz’ 
extensive and influential studies have strongly suggested that the 
overdeterrence theory—the Ferguson Effect—is unfounded. One 
component of official liability that is often overlooked is that 
government officers, especially police officers are almost always 
completely indemnified from civil judgments against them.105 The 
lynchpin in the Ferguson Effect is the idea that officers so greatly 
fear civil liability that they will refrain from acting in the course of 
duty. It is, of course, possible that officers fear more than just the 
financial component of a judgment against them. The spectacle of a 
trial, the potential for termination, and the damage to one’s 
reputation could all potentially contribute to the alleged 
overdeterrence.106 However, in serious cases of officer misconduct, 
immunity from a civil trial does not immunize the officer from the 
court of public opinion. If we analyze the outcomes of officers 
involved in some of the most high-profile cases of misconduct, we 
find that even when there is no pre-existing heightened scrutiny of 
officers—no reason for the officers to fear financial liability—
officers often suffer from public backlash.107 This suggests that the 
non-financial factors cannot justify overdeterrence because officers 
are always subject to repercussions from negative public opinion. 
Further, research has suggested that allegations of misconduct 
have little impact on internal matters such as opportunities for 
promotions or performance reviews. 108  Again, officers cannot 
                                                 
104. See, e.g., id.  
105. Lindsey De Stefan, No Man Is Above the Law and No Man Is Below It:” 
How Qualified Immunity Reform Could Create Accountability and Curb 
Widespread Police Misconduct, STETON HALL L. SCH. STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 2, 
18 (2017) (citing Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
885, 894 n. 41 (2014) (explaining that the Court has never given any empirical 
evidence to support its belief in the deterrent power of lawsuits)). 
106. See, e.g., Chao Xiong, City of St. Anthony, Officer Jeronimo Yanez Part 
Ways, The Star Tribune (2017), http://www.startribune.com/city-of-st-anthony-
officer-jeronimo-yanez-part-ways/433691813/.  
107. See generally Dewan, supra note 101. 
108. De Stefan supra note 105 at 18. 
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suggest that fear of internal repercussions affect their actions in the 
field because, frankly, they do not suffer internal repercussions.109 
Summarizing many of the conclusions reached in Schwartz’ papers, 
Lindsey De Stefan adds, “in many instances, even the police 
department that employs the officer suffers no direct financial 
consequences.”110 Often, the costs of litigation and judgments are 
factored into a city or department’s budget as a cost-of-doing-
business expense.111 Essentially, when neither the individual officer 
nor the supervising department suffers any significant consequence 
from an officer’s misconduct, we cannot consider internal 
repercussions a realistic source of the overdeterrence alleged by the 
Ferguson Effect. 
 What we are left with is the financial liability; proponents of 
the Ferguson Effect must rest their argument on the idea that 
officers fear the prospect of having to personally satisfy a judgment 
against them, and therefore are deterred from acting. On this narrow 
formulation, Schwartz’ research is again instructive; “While 
officers consistently report that the threat of liability deters 
misconduct, the threat of liability does not actually change most 
officers’ behavior on the job.” 112 
Second, we need to consider a question that proponents of the 
Ferguson Effect theory often take for granted: what behavior is 
(allegedly) being deterred and is that deterrence necessarily 
overbroad? Again, research suggests that any deterrence that does 
exist primarily impacts low-quality police behaviors.113  Data on 
street stops by Chicago police officers, for example, show a 
dramatic decrease in frequency following the release of video 
footage of the controversial shooting of Laquan McDonald.114 If the 
                                                 
109. See id.  
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of 
Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1077-78 
(2010). 
113. “Low-quality” is this author’s term meant to differentiate those police 
behaviors that are sanctimoniously guarded by qualified-immunity advocates and 
those which a reasonable observer would agree are not valuable to effective law 
enforcement. 
114 . John A. Shjarback et. al., De-Policing in the Wake of Ferguson: 
Radicalized Changes in the Quantity and Quality of Policing Among Missouri 
Police Departments,  50 J. CRIM. JUST. 42, 44, (2017)(quoting Rob Arthur & 
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decrease in street stops in fact led to an increase in crime, we could 
reliably vindicate the Ferguson Effect. However, when the rate of 
police stops in Chicago decreased, there was no significant increase 
in crime.115 In fact, researchers suggest that although the overall 
number of stops decreased, the quality of these stops improved.116 
This seems to answer our question; in the Chicago case study, the 
deterred behavior was frivolous street stops and searches. 117 If the 
deterrent effect of liability only touches behaviors such as these, 
shown to be empirically inefficient and qualitatively discriminatory, 
we ought not be concerned with overdeterrence. 118 
D.  Image 
1. Domestic 
For most members of a community, the legal intricacies of 
qualified immunity will not matter. The important thing to most 
citizens is the optics; police officers who violated an individual’s 
rights are getting off without so much as a reprimand.119 Indeed, the 
judicial system itself is complicit in this violation. As it relates to 
image, a lesson that policymakers seem to forget is that perception 
is reality. Professor Wayne Logan theorizes that “public perceptions 
of procedural justice can influence citizen willingness to comply 
with the law and assist police.” 120  Further, Logan asserts that 
instances in which flagrant violations of individual liberty, such as 
warrantless and unreasonable searches, are excused, the effect is to 
“lessen confidence in the perceived fairness and legitimacy of 
police.”121 
                                                 
Jeff Asher, Gun Violence Spiked–And Arrests Declined–In Chicago Right After 




116. Id. at 17–22. 
117. Dewan, supra note 101. 
118. See generally Shjarback et. al., supra note 114 at 11-17. 
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Negative perception of the police and courts is especially 
poignant in minority communities, where the perception that police 
officers can act with virtual impunity “can only lessen confidence 
in the perceived fairness and legitimacy of police, already strained 
by reports of police fabrications and racial bias.”122 Judge Stephen 
Reinhardt has remarked that “the Court’s recent treatment of . . . 
qualified immunity evinces a lack of sensitivity to the unequal 
treatment of minorities in our criminal justice system.”123 
2. International 
Beyond our borders too, the world takes notice when the United 
States denies justice to victims of institutional abuse and violence. 
The United Nations Human Rights Council issued a scathing 
condemnation of United States’ police violence practices, 
recommending: 
 [The United States should] [E]nsure that all instances of police 
brutality and excessive use of force by law enforcement officers were 
investigated promptly, effectively and impartially by an independent 
mechanism, with no institutional or hierarchical connection between 
the investigators and the alleged perpetrators; and provide effective 
remedies and rehabilitation to the victims.124 
Other recommendations from other committees within the 
United Nations Human Rights Council included that the United 
States “should ensure that reports of brutality and ill-treatment of . 
. . vulnerable groups by its law-enforcement are . . . thoroughly 
investigated and that perpetrators are . . . appropriately punished.”125 
One report concerning the torture of criminal suspects by Chicago 
police officers was especially concerned with lack of remedy 
                                                 
122. Id. 
123. Reinhardt, supra note 49 at 1251. 
124. U.N. Human Rights Council, Compilation Prepared by the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/WG6/22/USA/2, at 9 (2015) (available at https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/039/92/PDF/G1503992.pdf). 
125. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and 
Recommendations of the Committee against Torture, U.N. Doc. 
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provided to the victims. 126  It noted that, although many of the 
victims have been exonerated of the crimes for which they were 
detained, “the vast majority . . . have not received any compensation 
for the extensive injuries suffered . . . .”127 
Perhaps the body most on point in their recommendations is 
Amnesty International. In a comment to an UNHRC declaration on 
the Right to Life, Amnesty International commented: 
the right to life should include, as appropriate, all recognized forms 
of reparation, including: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, 
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition, illustrating specific 
measures that may be appropriate, taking into account the specific 
harm caused in each case, for each form.128 
It is uncertain whether Amnesty International made this comment 
with United States’ policies in mind, but its suggestion certainly 
connotes that the United States has an impoverished vision of the 
Right to Life. It is itself telling that criticism from a human rights 
body, so often leveled at dictatorial regimes and third-world 
autocrats, could apply equally to those countries as to the United 
States. 
At the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2015, attending 
countries offered recommendations to the United States ranging 
from the broad; “[We recommend the United States] [s]trengthen 
the existing mechanisms to prevent the excessive use of force and 
discriminatory practices in police work,”129 to the jarringly specific; 
“[We recommend the United States] [c]ollaborate closely with 
marginalized communities to fix the problems in the justice system 
                                                 
126. Id. 
127. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Concluding observations on the combined 
third to fifth periodic reports of the United States of America, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/C/USA/CO/3-5, at 13-14 (Dec. 19, 2014) (available at 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/247/23/PDF/ 
G1424723.pdf?OpenElement). 
128. The UN Human Rights Committee’s Proposed General Comment On the 
Right to Life: Amnesty International’s Preliminary Observations, Amnesty 
International, at 13 (June 12, 2005), https://www.amnesty.org/download/ 
Documents/IOR4016442015ENGLISH.pdf. 
129. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review: United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/12, at 22 (July 
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that continues to discriminate against them despite recent waves of 
protest over racial profiling and police killings of unarmed black 
men.”130 
Although it is questionable what weight countries actually give 
to recommendations from international human rights bodies, one 
thing that is certain is that the United States takes part in those 
assessments and itself issues recommendations to other countries. 
For example, in the same UNHRC summit in which Namibia and 
Peru made recommendations about the United States’ justice 
system, the United States suggested: 
[Namibia] [a]mend the labour law to address the inconsistency with 
regard to the minimum age to work and the school age for 
compulsory education, as well as more vigorously enforce the labour 
laws related to child labour (United States of America);131 
and 
[Peru] [e]nsure timely prosecution of human rights cases before the 
National Criminal Court and that all alleged violations of human 
rights, including labour rights, are investigated and prosecuted by the 
civilian justice system (United States of America);132 
The hypocrisy is blatant. But beyond the principle that countries 
in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones, the ability for the United 
States to carry out its foreign policy goals, especially humanitarian 
goals that involve influencing foreign legislation through 
diplomacy, is hampered when it does not practice what it 
preaches.133 Consider, for example, how the phenomenon of police 
                                                 
130. Id. at 21. 
131. U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the 
Universal Periodic Review: Namibia, at 21 (Mar. 21, 2011) (available at 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/122/97/PDF/ 
G1112297.pdf?OpenElement). 
132. U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review: Peru, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/15,  at 19 (Dec. 17, 2012) 
(available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/ 
RegularSession/Session22/AHRC2215_English.pdf).  
133. See, e.g., Anna A. Koptyaeva, The international image of the state as an 
instrument of soft power, 23 ARCTIC AND NORTH 15, 15 (2016) (“Constructing 
and advancing the international image of the country has become an importan[t] 
issue. In an era of globalization, many states are engaged in purposeful creation 
of their positive image, its development and promotion both at home and abroad 
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brutality going unpunished and remedied is perceived in countries 
suffering from endemic police corruption. Whether or not there is 
some nuanced legal justification for the police officers escaping 
liability, the rest of the world sees a system wherein rights are not 
always rights, and victims of government abuse will rarely see 
justice. 
E.  Judicial Resources 
One final justification for the policy of qualified immunity has 
to do with the scarcity of judicial resources. 134  The majority in 
Harlow wrote: 
Finally, the Court has more recently emphasized a third rationale—
constitutional litigation imposes high social costs, including the 
government’s litigation expenses and the diversion of officials’ 
attention toward defending lawsuits rather than performing their 
duties. These costs can be substantial, the Court says, because it 
assumes that a significant percentage of constitutional tort claims are 
frivolous.135 
This is the rationale behind the idea that qualified immunity can be 
granted as a matter of procedure as a 12(b)(6) motion.136 In theory, 
this insulates officers not only from liability, but from the lawsuit 
altogether. 
The argument put forward in Harlow rests on three vital 
assumptions: (1) defending against Constitutional torts would take 
up a large amount of judicial time and resources, (2) the net benefit 
to entertaining Constitutional tort claims is relatively low, and (3) 
qualified immunity solves the problem by dismissing lawsuits 
against defendant officers before any real burden has been put on 
them. 137  Even without quibbling about the first, the other 
                                                 
through ‘soft power’ mechanisms. State[] authorities realize that it is an important 
tool to protect national interests . . . attracting foreign investment[,] and 
increas[ing] influence in the world.”)  
134. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806–07. 
135. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
137. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 223 (noting the “substantial expenditure of scare 
judicial resources on difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome of the 
case.”); see also Rolfs, supra note 2 at 480–82.  
 
28
Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice, Vol. 39 [2018], Art. 7
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol39/iss1/7
Spring 2018] Stauber 153 
 
assumptions in this argument are both dubious and worryingly 
victim-averse. 
There is a factual question about whether qualified immunity 
actually prevents officers from being “diverted” from their official 
duties. In many cases, particularly excessive force lawsuits, the 
victim and the defendant officer will have different allegations of 
the facts.138 While it is true that a 12(b)(6) motion does not require 
a reconciliation of the facts in the case, in qualified immunity cases 
where it is clear that the Constitutional right was clearly established 
but the reasonableness of the officer is at issue, it is unlikely that a 
court would dismiss the suit until there was at least some 
preliminary discovery.139 
Take, for example, a case where a police officer repeatedly tased 
a suspect, even after that suspect was prostrate on the ground. The 
police officer had previously attended a mandatory training session 
in which city lawyers explained the decision in Smith v. City of Troy 
and advised officers how they could be compliant.140 The victim 
sued the officer, who responded that he was aware of Constitutional 
limit on his ability to tase the victim under Smith, but continued to 
do so because he thought that the victim had a concealed gun that 
he was reaching for.141 The victim vociferously denies that he had a 
gun. At the pre-trial proceedings, the city attorney could introduce 
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief could 
be granted under 12(b)(6)—alleging that, even assuming the 
victim’s version of events, there is no legally cognizable relief that 
the court could grant. Philip Sheng summarized the likely outcome 
of this type of scenario; “[i]n a situation. . . where a government 
official is entitled to qualified immunity under one set of facts, but 
not the other, summary judgment would be precluded until the 
disputed facts are resolved by a jury.”142 
This is a substantial carve-out of protection from lawsuits; if the 
case involves a dispute over only the reasonableness requirement of 
Pearson, questions of fact will allow the plaintiff to defeat the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss and proceed to discovery.143 If the 
                                                 
138. See Sheng, supra note 46 at 101. 
139. See id. 
140. See Smith v. City of Troy, Ohio, 874 F.3d 938 (6th Cir. 2017). 
141. See id. 
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case advances to discovery, the plaintiff will be allowed to make 
demands, take depositions, and use every tool provided by the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and the officer herself will almost certainly be 
“diverted” from her duties to some extent.144 This anathema to the 
purpose articulated in Harlow. 
An even more basic question remains on the issue of judicial 
resources: is not achieving justice for victims of police misconduct 
a socially and judicially valuable undertaking? The Harlow Court’s 
language makes their opinion on this question abundantly clear: 
“social costs [of constitutional litigation] include the expenses of 
litigation” and “the diversion of official energy from pressing public 
issues.” 145  Framed another way, the Justices believe that 
entertaining Constitutional litigation against government officers 
(not even necessarily succeeding in claims against officers, just 
hearing the lawsuit) is less valuable than the time they spend 
listening. 
A VICTIM-CENTRIC APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS 
As robust as is the body of analysis and criticism of qualified 
immunity, there is a dearth of creative solutions. One rare exception 
is James Pfander’s theory of nominal damages for Constitutional 
tort judgments. 146  According to Pfander, allowing litigants to 
pursue Constitutional redress against government officers, even 
without the possibility for monetary damages, is sufficient to 
achieve justice for victims.147 Further, nominal damages can help 
close the loophole of Constitutional articulation without mandatory 
sequencing; “a nominal damages claim could be an attractive option 
for plaintiffs who wish to secure a judicialjudicial test of their 
claim,” Pfander writes, and without potentially millions of dollars 
on the line “and with it much of the justification for qualified 
immunity, the suit . . . would allow the plaintiff to secure a 
                                                 
144. See generally, FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
145. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814. 
146 . See James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: 
Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601 
(2011). 
147. See generally, id. 
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constitutional decision even where the law was not clearly 
established.”148 
Pfander’s solution is an attractive one. Not only could it solve 
the problem of constitutional articulation, but it would also allow 
victims of police misconduct to achieve some notion of justice. As 
he points out, most victims of police misconduct are only harmed 
once, and often, they seek vindication more than money. 149 
However, Pfander’s solution, as with the many others that propose 
to tweak or adjust current procedures, is willing to accept the many 
assumptions that the Courts make. It concedes that police officers 
fear personal liability and that fear of personal liability chills 
officers’ actions. Further, it grants that the chilled behavior is 
otherwise valuable, that lawsuits against officers divert their 
attention from their official duties, and that qualified immunity in 
fact keeps officers out of the courtroom. Finally, it concedes that the 
Court’s time is better spent on other (undefined) matters than 
entertaining victims’ lawsuits against officers.150 
Rather than assuming that we need qualified immunity and then 
working backwards through the many issues addressed in this 
paper, it is time that we start by evaluating each of those 
assumptions and determining if we need qualified immunity. The 
thrust of this paper, as well as the conclusions of many prominent, 
diverse, and learned scholars, suggests that the assumptions on 
which courts and proponents routinely rest are flawed. 
Which raises the fundamental question: when the justifications 
for the policy are unsound and the damage it causes is great, is it 
time to abandon the policy? Is it time to put away the tweaks and 
the adjustments and admit that the machine has been broken from 
the beginning? 
Naturally, one of the first objections to scrapping qualified 
immunity will be administrative: the courts will be overrun, judges 
will be overworked, and through the megaphone we will hear that 
“justice delayed is justice denied.” But administrative problems can 
have administrative solutions. There is a natural threshold to how 
much litigants can burden a court. As with any other lawsuit, a 
plaintiff needs to compose a complaint, pay the filing fees to initiate 
the suit, and complete the early pre-trial matters before any 
                                                 
148. Id. at 1607-08. 
149. See id at 1628. 
150. See id at 1607–08. 
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substantial matter comes before a judge. Most of these would-be 
plaintiffs would need to hire a lawyer. Those lawyers are bound by 
professional codes of conduct which prohibit filing frivolous 
claims. All of those steps would require a substantial amount of time 
and effort. All things considered, the same factors that prevent 
frivolous and meritless lawsuits in any matter would apply in the 
context of Constitutional tort claims against government officers. 
There is no reason to believe that opening up this channel of 
litigation would have more of an impact on the court system than 
any other. 
CONCLUSION 
If we truly believe that victims have a right to redress for 
Constitutional harms, we cannot let the administrative concerns 
shape and limit that right. If we truly believe in the rights of the 
individual, we should reflect that belief in the “balancing of 
interests” suggested in Harlow. 151 Chilling, clogging the courts, 
and diverting officers’ attentions from their official duties are all 
weights on one side of the scale, but the denial of remedies for 
Constitutional violations—that is, the denial of the rights 
themselves—will surely weigh more. This is the fundamental 
concern of a victim-centric approach; how much do we value 
Constitutional tort claims and the results they produce? It is time 
that we recognized that to the Courts, that value is low, if not 
negligible. It is time that we structured an approach to 
Constitutional liability that does not have the government’s finger 
on the scales. It is time that we made justice attainable to victims of 
police misconduct, and affirmed that a right is always a right. 
 
                                                 
151. See Harlow, 457 U.S. 223. 
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